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Director of

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# National Intelligence Daily

Friday  
7 September 1984

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CPAS NID 84-210JX

7 September 1984

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**EL SALVADOR:**

**Military Situation**

*The guerrillas may start their fall offensive in the north soon while government forces are focusing on operations elsewhere to disrupt insurgent logistic and resupply networks. (S-NF NC-OC)*

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**The Army on Monday began a major operation in central Usulutan Department.**

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**Comment:** Earlier reporting indicated growing guerrilla strength in Chalatenango. If the insurgents can strike there quickly, they may be able to achieve some successes before the aggressive new head of the 4th Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Ochoa, becomes familiar with his new command and decides how best to use the forces at his disposal. (S-NF)

The naval battalion in southern Usulutan has the potential for disrupting one of the major guerrilla logistic and resupply centers, but maintenance practices will have to be improved substantially before the Navy can stop arms resupply activities at sea. (S-NF)-CIA, DIA, NSA-

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## National Intelligence Daily

*Monday  
10 January 1983*

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## EL SALVADOR: Increasing Pressure on Garcia

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*Opposition to Defense Minister Garcia within the military is growing as a result of rightist Army field commander Ochoa's refusal to accept political exile. (S)*

Garcia now has the support of only about "60 percent" of the officer corps. Although many officers see Ochoa's public defiance as a serious threat to military unity, his demand that Garcia resign reportedly is supported by most of the Air Force, many junior Army officers, and some key field commanders. (S NF NC OC)

There is no indication that Garcia is planning military action at this time against Ochoa's 1,000-man force in Cabanas Department. In response to the urging of a number of field-grade Army officers, the Defense Minister will convene a meeting of all commanders [redacted] and President Magana has called for a meeting of the government political commission. (S NF NC OC)

Despite a strong warning from Garcia, Assembly leader D'Aubuisson is attempting to spur support for Ochoa within the armed forces. [redacted]

*Comment: The damage to military unity already appears substantial and will increase the longer the dispute continues. The crisis could hasten guerrilla plans for an offensive later this month. A Western news agency reports the guerrillas attacked the capital of Chalatenango Department yesterday. (S)*

The quick development of sympathy and support for Ochoa underscores the depth of disgruntlement over Garcia's leadership and his widely criticized handling of the counterinsurgency. The opposition to the Defense Minister within the military is strengthening D'Aubuisson--his major political adversary--who probably will increase his efforts to oust Garcia. (S) -CIA, NSA-

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